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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FESTO AND THE COMPLETE BAR: WHAT’S LEFT OF THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS?

JACOB S. WHARTON, ESQ.*
“Momma’s don’t let your babies grow up to be cowboys,
Make them be doctors and lawyers and such”1
I. INTRODUCTION
It can be said that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.2 is steeped more in the traits of cowboys than
lawyers. That is, the decision makes an impact on the entire range, the range
of coverage that is, not the high prairie. The en banc decision has an instant
and profound impact on the interpretation of every issued unexpired U.S.
patent,3 those being licensed and every pending patent application. The rule
from Festo helps determine the scope of an issued patent, but the decision is
notable as it creates a complete bar to the application of the doctrine of
equivalents to practically every claim that has been amended during the
prosecution of the patent application.
Note that the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in this
case.4 The briefs seeking and opposing certiorari vigorously debate the policy
underpinnings of the decision.5 The high Court’s decision is eagerly awaited

*Mr. Wharton is an associate at Senniger, Powers, Leavitt & Roedel, St. Louis, Missouri. His
practice focuses on litigation, counseling and patent prosecution primarily in the biotechnological
arts. He can be contacted at (314) 231-5400 or at jwharton@senniger.com.
1. WILLIE NELSON, Momma Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to be Cowboys, on THE BEST
OF WILLIE NELSON (Heartland Music 1986).
2. 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Apr. 9, 2001) (No.
01-1543). Among others, amicus briefs have been filed by the Association of Patent Law Firms,
Federal Circuit Bar, Federation International des Counseils en Propriete Industrielle and the
American Intellectual Property Law Association.
3. There are approximately 1.2 million patents now in force prosecuted prior to the Festo
decision. See Reply to Brief in Opposition at 3, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 69 U.S.L.W. 3673 (U.S. June 18, 2001), available at
http://www.hoffmanbaron.com/news/.
4. 69 U.S.L.W. 3673 (U.S. June 18, 2001).
5. See Reply to Brief in Opposition, supra note 3, at 4 (“The holders of . . . patents
[prosecuted prior to the Festo decision] are now rendered defenseless against imitators who have
made insignificant changes to amended claim elements.”); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space
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by intellectual property community: attorneys, patentees, licensors and
licensees alike. But in the interim, the complete bar rule is the law of the land
and may ultimately be the prevailing law. Thus, a through analysis of the
decision is warranted.
The practical effect of the complete bar is that the drafter of an application
must take added precautions prior to filing the original application.
Commentators were quick to point out the myriad of red flags that Festo
raises.6 Though the decision certainly gives cause to change the approach
taken to drafting the original application,7 it should be noted that the
practitioner sometimes cannot possibly attend to every detail to their liking
before filing an application.8 Indeed, the nature of drafting a patent application
does not often lend itself to an ordered and scheduled process as an inventor
may disclose material in an erudite and oft in an ill-timed manner. The
author’s intent is to review the Festo decision and apply the practical lessons
from the viewpoint of the practitioner.
The Festo decision tackles the multi-faceted doctrine of equivalents;
beginning with its history via Supreme Court precedent and continuing through
Federal Circuit precedent. The majority then proceeds to blaze a well-marked
trail, be it for good or bad, along one simple and straight path. As background,
note that the doctrine of equivalents prevents an accused infringer from
avoiding liability for infringement by changing only minor or insubstantial
details of a claimed invention while retaining the invention’s essential
identity.9 Infringement will be found under the doctrine of equivalents if the
difference between the claimed and accused device or composition are
insubstantial.10
Substantiality is measured objectively from the viewpoint of one skilled in
the art and is often measured by the function-way-result test.11 Infringement
exists under this test if the accused product performs substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to produce substantially the same
result.12 The doctrine must balance the policy goals of ensuring that the

Sys./Loral, Inc., 249 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (applying complete bar to patent that
issued in 1978).
6. W.D. Wallace, Life After Festo: Guarding Against Copyists, INTELL. PROP. TODAY,
January 2001, at 8-11.
7. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin, 249 F.3d at 1326.
8. Gerry Gressel, Claim Drafting and Claim Amendment to Reduce the Festo Effect,
INTELL. PROP. TODAY, April 2001, at 24-25.
9. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
10. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson, Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1517 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
11. Id.
12. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608.
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patentee enjoy the full benefit of his patent and ensuring that the claims give
“fair notice” of the patent’s scope.13
To prevent the doctrine of equivalents from consuming the public notice
goal, prosecution history estoppel is used by the court.14 The doctrine operates
by preventing a patentee from claiming subject matter relinquished during
prosecution of a patent application. Estoppel occurs where the patentee has
taken certain actions before the Patent Office, including amendments to the
claims.15 Therefore, “the doctrine of equivalents is subservient to . . .
prosecution history estoppel.”16 The general idea behind prosecution history
estoppel is that the patentee, by actions taken during prosecution, puts the
public on notice of the rights claimed and the rights surrendered. Actions, such
as amendments made to claims, adding more specific elements in order to
overcome novelty17 or obviousness18 rejections based upon prior art cited by
the primary examiner, are the type of action that gives rise to prosecution
history estoppel.
The Supreme Court has noted that “the doctrine of equivalents, as it has
come to be applied since Graver Tank, has taken on a life of its own.”19 To
stem this life, the decision in Warner-Jenkinson stated that courts will have to
“decide whether the proffered reason [for an action made during prosecution]
is sufficient to overcome prosecution history estoppel as a bar to application of
the doctrine of equivalents to the element added by the amendment.”20 The
Court also stated that “where no explanation is established, . . . the court
should presume that the patent applicant had a substantial reason related to
patentability for including the limiting element added by the amendment.”21
Therefore, “prosecution history estoppel would bar the application of the
doctrine of equivalents as to that element.”22
Despite being urged by the Warner-Jenkinson court, the Federal Circuit
refused “to require judicial exploration of the equities of a case before allowing
application of the doctrine of equivalents,”23 refused to require “proof of
intent” on the part of the alleged infringer before the doctrine of equivalents

13. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
14. See, e.g., Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
15. See, e.g., Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376-77
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
16. Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 400-01 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
17. See 35 U.S.C. §102 (1999).
18. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1999).
19. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30 (1997).
20. Id. at 33.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 34.
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could be applied,24 and refused to adopt “independent experimentation” as “an
equitable defense to the doctrine of equivalents.”25 The court stated that the
“proper time for evaluating equivalency . . . is at the time of infringement, not
at the time the patent was issued.”26 However, even though prosecution
history estoppel may apply, the court stated that “if the patent holder
demonstrates that an amendment required during prosecution had a purpose
unrelated to patentability,27 a court must consider that purpose in order to
decide whether an estoppel is precluded.”28 In the event that “the patent holder
is unable to establish such a purpose, a court should presume that the purpose
behind the required amendment is such that prosecution history estoppel would
apply.”29
Prior to Festo the Federal Circuit applied the “flexible bar” approach.30
The flexible bar stated that prosecution history estoppel “may have a limited
effect” on the doctrine of equivalents “within a spectrum ranging from great to
small to zero.”31 Under the “flexible bar” the court came down differently,
flexing both ways so to say, both in support of an equitable case-by-case
approach32 and in support of a more-complete bar.33 The divergence in
approach certainly caused confusion as to the potential scope of equivalents

24. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 35-36.
25. Id. at 36.
26. Id. at 37.
27. An amendment to correct a typographical error would clearly fall into this category.
28. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 40-41.
29. Id. at 41.
30. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
31. Id. at 1363.
32. See, e.g., LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 867 F.2d 1572 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (vacating finding of non-infringement based on the holding that once a claim element
is amended, no equivalent is available); see also Dixie USA, Inc. v. Infab Corp., 927 F.2d 584,
588 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that prosecution history estoppel should not cause “a total preclusion
of equivalence”); Modine Mfg. Co. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1555-56
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (vacating finding of non-infringement under doctrine of equivalents due to
prosecution history estoppel because, although “the available range of equivalency is limited, by
estoppel, . . . the prosecution history and the prior art do not eliminate equivalents.”).
33. See, e.g., Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See also 5A
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.03[b], at 18-492 (1998):
“Beginning shortly after its creation in 1982, the Federal Circuit developed two lines of
authority on the scope of an estoppel based on an amendment or argument that
distinguished the prior art. One line followed a strict approach, according to which a
court refused to speculate whether a narrower amendment would have been allowed. The
other line followed a flexible or spectrum approach, which recognized that amendments
did not invariably preclude all equivalents . . . .”
Id.
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available.34 After the Warner-Jenkinson decision, the Federal Circuit revisited
the issue, the decisions thereafter reflect the concept that the court still decides
what subject matter a patentee has surrendered during prosecution to determine
the range of available equivalents.35
The Court in Warner-Jenkinson, stated that any amendment made for “a
substantial reason related to patentability” creates prosecution history estoppel.
The decision, albeit far reaching in nature, still left many questions
unanswered. Thus, with the Hughes “flexible bar” appearing inoperable, or at
least irreconcilable with the other Federal Circuit’s cases implementing a bar,
the Federal Circuit was then poised to resolve the ambiguities left by these
cases.
II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR EN BANC REVIEW
The Festo court requested briefs on five questions for rehearing en banc.
These five issues comprise the background on which the court constructs a
lengthy opinion, including a number of concurring and dissenting opinions.
For brevity’s sake, the majority opinion is the focus of this work. The
questions presented were:36
1. For the purposes of determining whether an amendment to a claim
creates prosecution history estoppel, is “a substantial reason related to
patentability,”37 limited to those amendments made to overcome prior
art under § 102 and § 103, or does “patentability” mean any reason
affecting the issuance of a patent?
2. Under Warner-Jenkinson, should a “voluntary” claim amendment - one
not required by the examiner or made in response to a rejection by an
examiner for a stated reason - create prosecution history estoppel?
3. If a claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel, under
Warner-Jenkinson what range of equivalents, if any, is available under
the doctrine of equivalents for the claim so amended?
4. When “no explanation for a claim amendment is established,”38 thus
invoking the presumption of prosecution history estoppel under

34. See Douglas A. Strawbridge et al., Area Summary, Patent Law Developments in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit During 1986, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 861, 88788 (1987).
35. Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1455-57 (Fed. Cir. 1998). See
also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1470, 1476-77 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that
the court determines the exact subject matter the patentee actually surrendered and if the accused
devise does not fall within the range of material surrendered, the doctrine of equivalents is not
barred).
36. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 187 F.3d 1381, 1381-82
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
37. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 33.
38. Id.
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Warner-Jenkinson, what range of equivalent, if any, is available under
the doctrine of equivalents for the claim element so amended?
5. Would a judgment of infringement in this case violate WarnerJenkinson’s requirement that the application of the doctrine of
equivalents “is not allowed such broad play as to eliminate an element
in its entirety.”39 In other words, would such a judgment of
infringement, post Warner-Jenkinson, violate the “all element” rule?
III. MAJORITY OPINION- THE “COMPLETE BAR”
The court answered the first question by stating that:
[f]or the purposes of determining whether an amendment gives rise to
prosecution history estoppel, a ‘substantial reason related to patentability’ is
not limited to overcoming or avoiding prior art, but instead includes any reason
which relates to the statutory requirements for a patent. Therefore, a
narrowing amendment made for any reason related to the statutory
requirements for a patent will give rise to prosecution history estoppel with
respect to the amended claim element.40

The Court, in Warner-Jenkinson, only addressed amendments made to
overcome objections based on prior art.41 The Festo court recognized a litany
of statutory requirements that must be satisfied before a valid patent can issue
and that are thus related to patentability. The list now includes patentability
requirements found in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101,42 102,43 103,44 and 112.45 The court
stated that they “see no reason why prosecution history estoppel should not
also arise from amendments made for other reasons related to
patentability . . . .”46 The response to question one is based on WarnerJenkinson’s statement that an amendment “does not necessarily preclude
infringement by equivalents of that element.”47 Thus, “if a patent holder can
39. Id. at 29.
40. Festo, 234 F.3d at 556.
41. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 30-34.
42. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1386 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (discussing the patentable subject matter requirement).
43. See Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding a patent
invalid because the claims were anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102).
44. See Mitsubishi Elec. Corp. v. Ampex Corp., 190 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding a
patent invalid because the claims were obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103).
45. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding a
patent invalid because the claims were not enabled, as required by 35 U.S.C.§ 112); Johnson
Worldwide Assoc., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (considering whether a
patent claim was invalid under the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, Paragraph
1.)
46. Festo, 234 F.3d at 567.
47. Id. at 567 (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33
(1997)).
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show from the prosecution history that a claim amendment was not motivated
by patentability concerns, the amendment will not give rise to prosecution
history estoppel.”48
The Court answered question two as follows:
Both voluntary amendments and amendments required by the Patent Office
signal to the public that subject matter has been surrendered. There is no
reason why prosecution history estoppel should arise if the Patent Office
rejects a claim because it believes the claim to be unpatentable, but not if the
applicant amends a claim because he believes the claim to be unpatentable.49

The court then cites a number of cases where the applicant clearly
surrendered subject matter during prosecution.50 The court again based their
rule on the lack of opposing precedent and stated that “[t]here is no reason why
an amendment-based surrender of subject matter should be given less force
than an argument-based surrender of subject matter.”51
The heart of the Festo opinion lies in the answer to question three. In
response, the court stated:
When a claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel with regard to a
claim element, there is no range of equivalents available for the amended claim
element. Application of the doctrine of equivalents to the claim element is
completely barred (a “complete bar”).52

Based on the assumption that the issue of whether a range of equivalents is
still available to an amended claim had not been addressed,53 the court
proceeded to independently decide the issue.54 Based upon their distinguishing
directive, that is, Congress specifically created the Federal Circuit to resolve

48. Festo, 234 F.3d at 567-68.
49. Id. at 568.
50. See, e.g., KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(concluding that “KCJ’s statements during prosecution reflect a clear and unmistakable
surrender” of subject matter that cannot be reclaimed through the doctrine of equivalents); Bayer
AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1252-53 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding that
“through Bayer’s statements to the PTO and the declarations if filed, Bayer made statements of
clear and unmistakable surrender of subject matter” which it cannot recapture through the
doctrine of equivalents); Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1583, (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (“Clear assertions made during prosecution in support of patentability, whether or not
actually required to secure allowance of the claim may . . . create an estoppel.”); Texas
Instruments Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(holding that arguments made during prosecution that emphasized one feature of the invention
estopped the patent holder from asserting that a device lacking that feature infringed the patent
under the doctrine of equivalents).
51. Festo, 234 F.3d at 568.
52. Id. at 569.
53. Id. at 569-71.
54. Id. at 571.
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issues unique to patent law,55 the court found the issue of prosecution history
estoppel, a judicially created doctrine,56 forthrightly in their jurisdiction.57
The court, maintaining the complete bar for policy reasons, extrapolated
that if the doctrine of equivalents is applied broadly, the definitional and
public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement are not met.58 If,
however, a complete bar is in place, the public is on notice as to what scope of
protection the claims, narrowed for reasons related to patentability, provide.
The patentee and the public can look to the prosecution file history, a public
record once a patent issues, to determine if any prosecution history estoppel
arises as to any elements of the claims.59 The complete bar also eliminates the
possible guessing that could go on as to the scope of equivalents available after
a narrowing amendment related to patentability.60 In this discussion, the court
weighs public notice versus patentee rights; and public notice certainly finds
favor with the en banc panel.
The court lamented that the flexible bar lacked a yardstick by which to
measure the range of equivalents when prosecution history estoppel applies.61
The outer limit of such equivalents is clearly marked by the prior art, but the
area of design between is a “zone of uncertainty” that can hamper commercial
development.62 The court offers an example of a claim that originally reads
“less than twenty” that is amended to read “less than five” in light of a
rejection over prior art that recites “less than fifteen.”63 The range between the
prior art and the amended claim available for patenting and commercialization
is ambiguous.64 The complete bar allows the public, and the patentee, to know
that an amended claim is limited to a literal interpretation of the claim
elements. The court then commented that “[a]lthough the flexible bar affords
the patentee more protection under the doctrine of equivalents, we do not
believe that the benefits outweigh the costs of uncertainty.”65 Concluding, the
court stated that the “application of a complete bar to the doctrine of
equivalents whenever a claim amendment gives rise to prosecution history
estoppel similarly reduces the conflict and tension between the patent

55. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (citing H.R.
Rep. No. 97-312, pp. 20-23 (1981)).
56. Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
57. Festo, 234 F.3d at 571-72. Note that the position taken by the Federal Circuit leaves
their decision ripe for Supreme Court review.
58. Id. at 576.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 577.
62. Festo, 234 F.3d at 577.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

FESTO AND THE COMPLETE BAR

289

protection afforded by the doctrine of equivalents and the public’s ability to
ascertain the scope of the patent.”66
As to question four, the court answered that “[w]hen no explanation for a
claim amendment is established, no range of equivalents is available for the
claim element so amended.”67 Citing to Warner-Jenkinson, the court stated
“where no explanation is established, . . . prosecution history estoppel would
bar the application of the doctrine of equivalents as to that element.”68
As to question five, the court found no need to reach a decision on this
question based on the application of the complete bar to the patents at issue in
the Festo case. They did, however, leave this question for another day.69
IV. DISCUSSION
The answers presented above basically create a two-prong test: (1) does the
amendment narrow the claims; and (2) was the amendment related to
patentability. This test pertains to the majority of all amendments made during
prosecution. The patentee is now faced with two formidable hurdles to
overcome to secure a finding of infringement. Most amendments, even if
made for clarification, perhaps in response to a § 112 rejection, will be in
response to a statutory rejection. The rule, therefore, may be overreaching in
nature. Even though a straight-forward, easy-to-apply rule has its obvious
advantages, the untoward side of such a doctrine is revealed in its application.
A competitor may easily avoid a patent under the new rules. The
competitor simply orders a copy of the prosecution history and reviews the
amendments made during prosecution. If the amendments were made for
reasons of patentability or the reason cannot be ascertained from the
prosecution history, the competitor is free to operate within what could have
traditionally been included in the range of equivalents.
The court notes that the field of biotechnology is one critical field that may
be harmed by the majority’s rule.70 Completely barring the patent holder from
turning to the doctrine of equivalents for amended claim limitations may
severely limit the scope of biotechnology patents. For example, a protein
molecule can only be claimed as the complete and specific sequence of amino
acids comprising the protein.71 The nature of protein chains are such that the
amino acids that comprise the protein are interchangeable without changing the
functionality, and therefore typically the commercial limitation, of the protein.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 578.
Festo, 234 F.3d at 578
Id. (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997)).
Id.
Id. at 616 (J. Michel, concurring in part).
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.821 (2000)
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The impact of this basic rule of biology may seem unassuming. However,
as the Federal Circuit has noted, in a single patent claiming the protein
erythropoietin, “over 3,600 different protein analogs can be made by
substituting interchangeable acids at only a single amino acid position, and
over a million different analogs can be made by substituting three amino
acids.”72 Because a substituted homology may retain the desired functionality
of the claimed sequence, a competitor seeking to make, use or sell a protein
that is claimed in an issued patent with an amended claim simply has to design
around the patented sequence. Such design around can be accomplished by
simply finding unclaimed substitutions producing proteins functionally
equivalent to the claimed protein.73
When drafting a patent, in particular claims directed towards a protein, it
would appear the practitioner would have to meticulously and individually
disclose and claim each and every functionally equivalent homolog. Initially
drafting clear broad claims will reduce the possibilities of the need for an
amendment and, therefore, the impact Festo may have on the claim.
After Festo, claims need to be drafted in a manner that distinctly delineates
the elements contained therein. A patent attorney drafting an application at
this time should pay close attention while drafting claims with ranges and
excessively long claims.74 Chemical patents are particularly likely to have a
range appear in a claim. A range, however, can show up in patents covering
all specimens of subject matter. Claim ranges should be split to include clearly
identified limits, as opposed to the traditional “between x and y.” To avoid
losing any range of equivalents due to an amendment, it would be better to set
out the ranges separately. A claim that splits the range into two discrete
elements allows for one end of the range to be amended if necessary without
potentially ambiguous amendments being made to the entire claim.
Run-on claims are claims consisting of long run-on sentences that describe
the composition and perhaps function of a composition. Such claims are best
broken down into individual elements as Festo impacts claim elements, not the
claims in their entirety. Claims broken down into distinct elements can be
carefully amended to overcome prior art or any other statutory reason for
rejection with less risk of losing the range of equivalents available to the nonamended elements. In either situation, with ranges or lengthy descriptions, the
72. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
73. For a response to this biotechnology hypothetical, see Festo, 234 F.3d at 597-98:
“I believe that the concern is largely theoretical. The first inventors to enter a field are
only entitled to claim what they can describe and enable, and I am confident that
competent patent attorneys can readily craft their claims to cover that subject matter so
that estoppel can be avoided. Moreover, subsequent inventors will be better able to find
and develop improved products without fear of lawsuits. Predictability will be enhanced.”
Id. (Lourie, J., concurring).
74. For an excellent discussion on drafting tips, see Gressel, supra note 5.
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key is set out each and every element of a claim in distinct and recognizable
units.
One criticism of the ruling is that the complete bar applies to all unexpired
issued patents. Past drafting efforts, made prior to the decision but with
painstaking care, may contain many pitfalls that the patent attorney can do
little about today. The decision, therefore, necessitates a review of the
prosecution history of all commercially important issued and valid patents to
determine if an addition filing or reissue is necessary, possible or desired.
Although the commercially important elements of a claim may stay intact
under a Festo review, the scope of available licenses and the value of existing
licenses may be severely emoted.
V. CONCLUSION
The court did not have to adopt the complete bar, workable alternatives do
exist. As Judge Plager said of the majority view, “[i]t is a second-best solution
to an unsatisfactory situation.”75 Judge Plager advocates that the doctrine of
equivalents, a judge made rule in the first place, ought to be applied in equity,
on a case-by-case basis. The equitable application of the doctrine is certainly
appealing. For the patentee, this would leave the door open to argue the
intended and resultant effect of an amendment does not unnecessarily limit the
scope of equivalents to which a claim is privileged. The author suggests a
rebuttable presumption rule may operate more equitably. When an amendment
with respect to patentability is made, a rebuttable presumption that a complete
bar to equivalents would then arise. The patentee could then show that the
amendments were not made to overcome prior art but for reasons such as
clarity. The common law and district courts can certainly handle such a rule.76
However, others welcome the rule. The rule facilitates the interpretation of
issued patents operating as prior art, thereby facilitating patentability and
freedom to operate searches. The rule also allows competitors to design
around issued patents once the prosecution history has been reviewed. These
points, of course, cut both ways. The rule will operate to severely impair the
rights of the patentee and the decision has removed a prodigious degree of
equity from patent litigation. So to answer the question presented in the title,
what is left of the doctrine of equivalents, is clearly, “not much.” In the
interim, remember, unless an patentee can squarely demonstrate an amendment
(1) does not narrow the scope of the claims and (2) was not made for
patentability, there will be a complete bar to the application of the doctrine of
equivalents.
75. Festo, 234 F.3d 591.
76. See Control Resources, Inc. v. Delta Elecs., Inc., 133 F. Supp.2d 121, 123-125 (D. Mass.
2001) (criticizing the Federal Circuit in Festo for usurping the common law function of the
district courts).
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